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Introduction 
 
‘Territory itself is passive; it is human beliefs that give it meaning.’ (Knight, 1982, p. 517) 
 
In the jigsaw puzzle of international borders that delineate the world’s states, the shape of 
many pieces is frequently under debate. The CIA Factbook (2016) identifies 188 states, out 
of a total of 193, engaged in some kind of territorial disagreement. Despite the prolific 
studies on the relationship between territorial disputes and war (Vasquez & Henehan, 
2001), variations in territorial disputes (Wright & Diehl, 2014), and attempts at resolution 
(Shannon, 2009), there remains surprisingly little on the legitimation strategies political 
leaders use to justify their territorial claims. The study of legitimation strategies in territorial 
disputes is vitally important because, without analysing how each side publicly justifies 
itself, it can be difficult to understand who, or which international organisation, each actor 
is appealing to, how each side views the other, the chances of compromise, and even what 
norms are considered dominant in the international system. Understanding an actor’s 
legitimation strategies could even help in the prediction of their next move, as the actor 
tries to make their actions appear to conform to the motives they claim to have. In an 
attempt to shrink this gap in the literature, this thesis will focus on the case study of the 
Crimean conflict since 2014 to ask: how do Putin and Poroshenko justify their claims to 
Crimea? 
 
The diversity of territorial disputes renders it necessary to narrow the scope of what is 
otherwise a very broad area of study. Territorial disputes can concern anything from natural 
resources, like the potential oil reserves in the South China Sea, to a divided population, like 
on the Korean peninsula, to control of a symbolic landmark like Jerusalem. A dispute can 
concern a small border ambiguity, like the exact location of the Faroe Islands’ continental 
shelf, or a vast territory like Western Sahara. It can concern a maritime region, like that 
between Turkey and Greece, or a piece of land like the Abyei area between Sudan and 
South Sudan. It can involve military action, like the Falklands War, or be resolved through 
negotiations, like the border inconsistencies between Bhutan and China. It can involve 
territory inhabited by millions of people, like the Gaza Strip, or land that is completely 
uninhabited, like Antarctica. It can be a dispute between states, like India and Pakistan’s 
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conflict over Kashmir, or a dispute between indigenous people and the state, like the Native 
American campaign for more land reserves. So as to look at the type of territorial dispute 
with the greatest potential for violence, and therefore the type most in need of 
international attention, this investigation will focus on a territorial dispute between states, 
involving military action, on a vast piece of land with a significant population. So as to focus 
on the actors with the greatest political influence over their state’s foreign policy, and who 
are presumed to speak on behalf of their population, the scope will be narrowed by its focus 
only on the Russian and Ukrainian heads of state, Putin and Poroshenko. Finally, the scope 
will be narrowed even further by the epistemological premise that the motivations behind 
an individual actor’s decision to claim a piece of land are impossible to know, since it would 
require knowledge of the thought processes within their mind. This study will therefore be 
limited to an investigation of the public justifications made by the heads of state in one type 
of territorial dispute.  
 
The most illuminating example of an inter-state territorial dispute, involving military action, 
and a large population and territory, is the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia 
over the Crimean peninsula. With two clear-cut sides and much rhetoric flying back and 
forth, the available data on Putin and Poroshenko’s legitimation strategies is of sufficient 
quantity and quality for in-depth analysis. A landmass protruding into the Black Sea, Crimea 
has been a point of contention for centuries. Annexed by the Russian empire in 1783, the 
site of the 1853–56 war between Russia, France, Britain, and the Ottomans, and the location 
of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, it plays a key part in the narrative of Russian history. Despite 
being inhabited mainly by Russian-speakers, its administration was transferred to the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic by Khrushchev in 1954 and this was cemented in 
Ukraine’s sovereign control of the peninsula after the collapse of the USSR. In a sudden 
move in March 2014, Putin took advantage of the Euromaidan protests in Kiev and 
announced the annexation of Crimea. To demonstrate Russia’s right to the peninsula, Putin 
called a referendum on Crimea’s status, claiming, amid accusations of electoral fraud, that 
96% of voters had elected to join Russia. Ukrainian president since June 2014, Poroshenko 
lost no time in asserting Ukraine’s right to the peninsula and, coupled with the intense 
fighting in eastern Ukraine between separatist groups and the Ukrainian army, Ukrainian-
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Russian relations have rapidly deteriorated. Although Poroshenko continues to assert that 
Crimea will one day be reunified with Ukraine, that prospect looks increasingly unlikely.  
 
The range of legitimation strategies Putin and Poroshenko could employ is extensive. They 
might, for example, argue that controlling the peninsula is in their strategic interest, 
focusing on its location and the presence of the Black Sea Fleet. Alternatively, they could 
argue that the Crimean population’s linguistic, cultural, or ethnic similarities to their own 
nation make reunification imperative. Instead, they might focus on Crimea’s historical 
significance, and argue that they deserve Crimea to atone for historical injustices. They 
might use the same strategies as each other, different strategies to different audiences, 
combinations of strategies, or adapt their strategies to undermine each other. Through a 
content analysis of Putin and Poroshenko’s public statements on Crimea, the hypotheses 
will be tested that both presidents invoke normative legitimation strategies to an 
international audience, and that Putin, in particular, uses national-historical legitimation 
strategies to his domestic audience. 
 
The argument will start with an explanation in Section 1 of the analytical framework, 
defining a legitimation strategy, elaborating various typologies, and explaining why 
international norms should be taken into account, before Section 2 details the qualitative 
and quantitative methods used to analyse the presidents’ speeches. Section 3 contains the 
qualitative analysis of the data, followed by the quantitative analysis in Section 4. Section 5 
contains the discussion of how the presidents hybridise their strategies, adapting their 
emphasis depending on the audience they are addressing. Section 6 looks at the broader 
questions raised by the analysis, asking why Putin and Poroshenko form their arguments as 
they do, and investigating whether the findings are corroborated by the key literature on 
the topic, before the final part concludes the argument. 
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Section 1: Analytical Framework 
 
The first element to clarify when investigating the types of legitimation strategies Putin and 
Poroshenko use is the definition of a legitimation strategy. Stacie Goddard (2006, p. 40) 
defines a legitimation strategy as ‘the public and recognised reasons to justify a claim to an 
issue’, while Jennifer Gronau and Henning Schmidtke (2016, p. 540) give the more 
substantial definition of a ‘goal-oriented activity employed to establish and maintain a 
reliable basis of diffuse support for a political regime’. Synthesised, the two can be 
condensed down to a definition of a legitimation strategy as a concerted attempt to gain 
legitimacy, which in turn can be defined as conformity to social norms. Gronau and 
Schmidtke (2016, p. 541) also point out that a legitimation strategy can be either 
‘substantive’, involving institutional change, or ‘communicative’, involving discursive acts 
such as speech-making, and it can be carried out by a plethora of actors, from the head of 
government to the media. For the purposes of this investigation, the focus will be on 
communicative legitimation strategies carried out by the heads of state of Russia and 
Ukraine. 
 
There has been relatively little written about the types of legitimation strategies a political 
leader might use to justify their position in a territorial dispute. As Travis Nelson (2010) 
argues, the literature on legitimation strategies focuses either on how such strategies affect 
state behaviour, or on whether the change over time of the types of strategies used is 
evidence of a shift in international norms. The most recent typology of legitimation 
strategies was contributed by Andrew Burghardt (1973, p. 228-237), who argues that there 
are seven types of strategies. With the first strategy, the political leader argues that they 
already have ‘effective control’ over the given territory and so deserves the territory by 
default. With the second, the leader argues they have an historical right to the territory, 
either because their people were there first or have been there longest. With the third, a 
leader legitimises their claim on the basis that their people share a culture. With the fourth, 
a leader claims a piece of land because it is territorially connected to their current territory. 
Under the fifth strategy, a leader claims that their population requires the territory in order 
to economically develop. Under the sixth strategy, a minority claims a right to a certain 
territory, and under the seventh strategy, a leader claims a right to spread an ideology. 
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As well as Burghardt’s, there are other typologies that have been developed over the last 
decades. Norman Pounds (1972, p. 252), for example, somewhat overlaps with Burghardt, 
arguing that there are five types of legitimation strategy, based on the respective claims 
that: a piece of territory is strategically required, it is of economic necessity, the people 
living there are ethnically linked to the leader’s own population, it is of close proximity, 
within its sphere of influence, and it is geographically connected. Similarly, Norman Hill 
(1945, p. 120) articulates another five types of legitimation strategies: that a piece of land 
and people have historical importance, that it is geographically connected, necessary for 
economic reasons, strategically necessary, and that it would allow ethnic reunification. On 
top of this, Robert Strausz-Hupe and S T Possony (1954, p. 327) list a further twelve: that 
there is a common language, religion, culture, history, ethnicity, sociology, or psychology, 
that a border change makes military sense, that it would be economically beneficial, 
administratively beneficial, that the territory is of close proximity, and that it is ideologically 
necessary. Each of these four typologies shares some types in common, but, amalgamated, 
seventeen types of legitimation strategies have so far been theorised: administrative, 
cultural, economic, ethnic, geographic, historical, ideological, linguistic, military, 
psychological, religious, sociological, strategic, based on effective control, minority rights, 
proximity, or spheres of influence. 
 
The fundamental problem with these typologies, however, is that their authors do not 
distinguish between the legitimation strategies directed towards a domestic audience and 
those directed at an international one. This is vitally important because, although the 
political leader needs both audiences to recognise the territorial claim, this recognition 
comes in different forms. From a domestic audience, recognition comes in the form of 
national identification with the claimed territory and population, while, from an 
international audience, recognition comes in the form of acceptance that the territorial 
claim conforms to international norms.  This requires the leader to use what Rodger Payne 
(2001, p. 43) calls ‘issue framing’, whereby they discursively frame their actions in such a 
way as to gain legitimacy. While Payne claims that issue framing enables the actor to 
‘provide a singular interpretation of a particular situation’ (Payne, 2001, p. 39), a political 
leader can in fact use issue framing to provide multiple interpretations. By emphasising 
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different arguments to different audiences, the leader can employ emotive reasons for their 
nation to identify with the claimed territory and population, while also demonstrating how 
their actions conform to international norms. 
 
Of the numerous legitimation strategies put forward in the four typologies, many are 
insufficient to persuade the domestic population to identify with the claimed territory and 
population. It is unlikely, for example, that administrative, geographic, or strategic 
arguments, or arguments relating to spheres of influence or proximity, will be sufficient. 
Since the end of the Cold War, ideological arguments have lost credence, and religious 
arguments are unlikely in a region without notably strong religious fervour. It is likely 
instead that a political leader will use a legitimation strategy based on the premise that the 
domestic population has deep historical links to the claimed population and territory. This is 
because, in order for the political leader to persuade the domestic population that the 
claimed population and territory constitute a fundamental part of their national identity, 
they have to persuade them that they and the claimed population are part of the same 
‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983, p. 6). In other words, the leader must persuade the 
domestic population that they have something fundamentally in common with the claimed 
population, and that something is a common historical experience. It is the idea that, 
despite differences of ethnicity, culture, religion, or even language, everyone in the 
imagined community is a cog in the wheel of the ever-turning tide of history. The 
elucidation of a shared historical experience is woven through the telling of historical myth. 
As Geoffrey Hosking and George Schöpflin (1997, p. 19) argue, the telling of historical myth 
‘is one of the ways in which nations establish and determine the foundations of their own 
being’. Through myths, ‘boundaries are established with respect to other communities’ 
(Hosking & Schöpflin, 1997, p. 20) as the nation defines its group identity by who shares in 
the myth. By expounding national-historical myths, therefore, the political leader can 
expand the boundaries of the national identity to encourage national identification with the 
claimed territory and population, thereby legitimising their claim to their domestic 
population. 
 
It is likely that Putin, more than Poroshenko, will make recourse to national-historical 
arguments in his domestic legitimation strategies. This is firstly because, after the collapse 
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of the USSR in 1991, Russia faced a fundamental crisis of national identity. Having 
historically been a multi-ethnic empire, Russia has experienced significant border changes 
and different imperial configurations that have, in the words of Geoffrey Hosking (1998, p. 
xix), ‘impeded the formation of a nation-state’. With non-ethnic Russians making up around 
20% of the population and the constant threat of right-wing Russian nationalism, Putin faces 
the need to articulate an inclusive Russian national identity based not on ethnicity but 
shared historical experience. Secondly, since Crimea had belonged to Russia until 1956, 
Putin has significant grounds on which to weave myths of Russian-Crimean historical ties. 
Poroshenko, meanwhile, although presiding over a nation deeply divided between east and 
west, so with considerable need to develop a unified national identity, lacks the grounds on 
which to imagine Crimea as historically Ukrainian. As Hosking and Schöpflin point out, for a 
myth to be believable by the population, it must be grounded in some historical fact. Since 
Ukraine only gained Crimea 60 years ago, it is unlikely that national-historical arguments will 
be of considerable use to Poroshenko. 
 
Although there is almost no literature on Poroshenko, much of the literature on Putin 
supports the argument that he has been using national-historical strategies throughout his 
time in office. Marvin Kalb (2015, p. 24), in particular, argues that Putin’s speech on 18 
March 2014 announcing the annexation of Crimea, demonstrated Putin’s ability to 
‘manipulate history’ to ignite Russian patriotism. Kalb (2015, p. 23) claims the speech was a 
‘short course on Russian history, occasionally inaccurate, exaggerated, but always patriotic’. 
Richard Sakwa (2008, p. 219), in his broader study of Putin’s presidency, argues that this has 
been the purpose of much of Putin’s rhetoric: to ‘reconcile Russia’s various pasts’, with 
specific emphasis on the most controversial period of Russian history – the Stalin era. In 
making symbolic gestures such as reintroducing the Soviet national anthem, refusing to 
move Lenin from his mausoleum, and altering the plaque next to the eternal flame from 
Volgograd to Stalingrad, Sakwa argues that Putin has frequently tried to integrate Russia’s 
historical narratives. He has done so in particular, argues Ivo Mijnssen (2009, p. 284), by 
emphasising Russia’s valour in World War Two, so much so that Ivan Kurilla (2009, p. 270) 
goes as far as saying that ‘the Putin administration’s most impressive achievements lie in 
the sphere of symbolic politics’. 
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To an international audience, however, the political leader making a territorial claim 
requires a different type of recognition. Rather than recognition that the claimed territory 
and population are legitimately part of a national identity, the leader needs recognition 
from the international system that their control of the territory and population is 
legitimately in accordance with international norms. The leader is therefore likely to use 
arguments that ‘reflect what states believe will be acceptable normative arguments to a 
broader international community’ (Nelson, 2010, p. 129). What exactly counts as an 
international norm has certainly changed over time, but it is clear that since 1945, and 
particularly since the end of the Cold War, the liberal norms of democracy, human rights, 
and individual freedom have been in the ascendency. Initially codified in the UN Charter and 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, they have been further entrenched in international 
treaties on the rights of women, children, and minorities, and, in 2005, with the 
Responsibility to Protect. While the claim made by Beth Simmons, Frank Dobbin, and 
Geoffrey Garrett (2006, p. 787) that there has been a ‘global trend towards liberalism’ might 
transpire to be premature, given the backlash to liberalism from European right-wing 
nationalists, the dispersion of Islamist terrorism across the Middle East and North Africa, 
and the increasing power wielded by China, liberal norms still dominate international 
institutions such as the UN, EU, and OSCE, and still characterise international discourse. In 
order to gain international support for their actions, or, in the case of Putin, mitigate the risk 
of international reprisals, the Russian and Ukrainian presidents are likely to frame their 
actions towards Crimea as the expression of international liberal norms. Since norms are 
socially created, and exist to the extent that actors say they exist, Putin and Poroshenko will 
likely act on the premise that the more acceptable they claim their actions to be, the more 
acceptable the international community are likely to find them.  
 
There is some evidence that political leaders use claims to international norms to their 
advantage, particularly when they know their actions are unpopular. Jeremy Moses, Babak 
Bahador, and Tessa Wright (2011, p. 355), for example, argue that Bush and Blair used two 
key narratives to justify the invasion of Iraq: a security narrative and liberal humanitarian 
narrative. They find that while 82.4% of arguments Bush and Blair used were related to 
security, 12.6% of their arguments related to humanitarianism. The fact that Bush and Blair 
emphasised their humanitarian desire to promote democracy and protect the rights of 
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Iraqis is taken by Moses, Bahador, and Wright (2011, p. 357) to argue that Bush and Blair 
were seeking international legitimacy. Roy Allison (2009, p. 175) makes a similar argument 
relating to Putin’s intervention in Georgia in 2008. He argues that although the invasion was 
motived by strategic concerns, Russia’s desire to be seen as internationally legitimate meant 
that ‘the Georgia operation had to be cloaked in a legal and normative discourse’. Allison 
(2009, p. 177) argues that Putin manipulated international norms and law in his own 
interests, claiming the need to protect Russian ‘citizens’ abroad and preventing a 
‘humanitarian catastrophe’, so as to frame his actions as congruent with international 
norms.  
 
Given these arguments, two hypotheses will be tested. The first is that both presidents use 
international norms when addressing a primarily international audience, and the second is 
that Putin in particular uses national-historical arguments when addressing a primarily 
domestic audience. Exactly which norms they choose to employ, which aspects of history 
they choose to interpret, how they combine national-historical and normative strategies, 
and what emphasis they place on each remains to be investigated. 
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Section 2: Methods 
 
To test this hypothesis, I examined all Putin and Poroshenko’s major public speeches, 
interviews, and statements relating to the annexation of Crimea until September 2016. I 
gathered Putin’s speeches from March 2014 onward, when he announced the annexation of 
Crimea, and Poroshenko’s speeches from June 2014 onward, when he became Ukrainian 
president. I gathered approximately 10,000 words each of Putin and Poroshenko’s 
discourse, comprised of 8 speeches respectively, from the Russian government and 
Ukrainian government websites, news and video-sharing sites. Although previous efforts 
have been made to analyse Putin’s rhetoric (see Kalb, 2015 and Slade, 2007), they are 
extremely descriptive and none uses an explicit methodology, providing plenty of ground on 
which to build. So as to capture both the nuances and overall emphasis of the texts, I 
conducted both qualitative and quantitative content analysis. Furthermore, so as to take in 
the micro and macro picture of each text, I decided to code on three levels of analysis – 
their use of language, the references or citations they made, and their overall arguments. 
The first step was to review the speeches to identify broadly what legitimation strategies 
the presidents use. Having discovered they used national-historical and normative 
arguments, I developed a system (see Table 1) to code the language, references, and 
arguments by whether they were part of a national-historical or normative legitimation 
strategy.  
 
Table 1: Examples of data by category 
Level of analysis 
Type of legitimation strategy 
National-historical Normative 
Language 
The use of words such as… 
Mythical, ancient, 
homeland, sacred, soil, 
nation, native, 
brotherhood, blood, 
heritage  
Illegal, violating, invasion, 
unprovoked, democracy, 
peace, rights, terrorism, 
coup, legitimate 
References 
The use of references to… 
The Second World War, the 
USSR, Khrushchev’s giving 
Crimea to Ukraine, ancient 
Rus’, Russia’s defeat of 
Napoleon 
The UN Charter, Kosovo, the 
EU Strategic Framework for 
Human Rights and 
Democracy, the Minsk 
Agreement 
Arguments 
The use of arguments such 
as… 
Crimea is the homeland of 
the Russian/Ukrainian 
people, Russia/Ukraine has 
been a victim of history, 
The referendum was (il)legal, 
Russia’s intervention was 
(not) designed to protect 
Crimeans’ rights, 
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Russia/Ukraine is a bastion 
of civilisation 
Russia/Ukraine is a member 
of international society  
 
There were inevitably occasions when it was difficult to categorise data into one set or 
another. When Putin argued, for example, that the international recognition of Kosovo was 
a precedent for the recognition of Crimea, I could have categorised this argument as part of 
a national-historical legitimation strategy or one based on international norms. In such 
instances, I decided on a case-by-case basis, looking at the premise behind each point. In the 
example of Kosovo, I categorised Putin’s reference as being part of a normative strategy 
because what underpinned Putin’s claim was not that Kosovo was historical but that the 
international community recognised the norm of self-determination. 
 
Having conducted the qualitative analysis, I moved on to the quantitative stage. For each 
speech, I used the above coding system to calculate the percentage of sentences that were 
normative, national-historical, or neutral, counting as ‘neutral’ any statement that pertained 
to the Crimea conflict but did not relate to any particular legitimation strategy. Using the 
online tool, wordcounttool.com, I identified Putin and Poroshenko’s 30 most frequently 
used words. Finally, although I looked for quantitative and qualitative change over time, I 
did not find any discernible trend, and so have not included any discussion of such findings 
here. 
 
A key constraint was that all the analysis was conducted in English, meaning that the 
connotations of some Russian and Ukrainian words were lost. Given that there is no direct 
translation for these connotations in English, both the Russian words народ and люди, for 
example, had to be translated as meaning ‘people’, even though the former implies a 
national group while the latter implies a group of individuals. This was not too significant a 
problem, however. If this study were focused on the type of nationalism Putin advocates 
then it would be useful to explore the different words for ‘people’, but in the present 
framework the obscuring of connotations did not interfere with the categorisation of 
sentences into national-historical or normative strategies. 
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Section 3: Qualitative Data 
 
This section will detail the qualitative data, looking first at Putin and Poroshenko’s national-
historical legitimation strategies and then their normative strategies, analysing each at the 
level of their language, references and citations, and overall argumentation.  
 
3.1: National-historical strategies 
 
Linguistic analysis 
Throughout his speeches, Putin consistently uses language to emphasise the national-
historical bond between Russia and Ukraine. Referring to Russia as the ‘Fatherland’ (2014d), 
‘Motherland’ (2014e), ‘Homeland’ (2014e), ‘common home’ (2014e), or ‘native shores’ 
(2015) of all Russian speakers, he implicitly denies the Ukrainian claim that Ukrainians and 
Russians are separate nations, arguing that the two share a ‘civilisation’ (2014a, 2014b, 
2014e). In using the word ‘reunification’, rather than merely ‘unification’, when referring to 
the annexation of Crimea (2016, 2015a, 2014b, 2014d, 2014e), he emphasises Russia’s 
‘historical’ bond (2014b, 2014d) specifically with the peninsula. Emphasising Russia’s 
military strength, he refers to World War 2 as the ‘Great Patriotic War’ (2014b, 2014c), and 
repeats that the Soviet army ‘liberated’ Europe from the Nazis (2014b, 2014d), portraying 
Russia as the historic saviour. Declaring in his 2014 Federal Assembly address that Russia has 
historically proved itself to be ‘mature’, ‘united’, ‘truly sovereign’ and a ‘strong state’ 
(2014b), he further portrays Russia as superpower with the strength to challenge the West. 
 
Poroshenko’s national-historical language is, inevitably, almost the mirror image of Putin’s. 
He refers to Ukraine (as opposed to Russia) as Crimeans’ ‘Homeland’ (2016b, 2014f), 
describing Crimea’s connection to Ukraine as ‘spiritual’, ‘civil’, ‘sacred’, and ‘historically 
determined’ (2016b). Unlike Putin, however, who explicitly denies that he annexed Crimea 
to gain territory, Poroshenko emphasises the importance of the land itself, less able than 
Putin to claim national-historical links with the mainly Russian-speaking Crimean population. 
Referring to Crimea as ‘Ukrainian land’ (2016b) or ‘Ukrainian soil’ (2015b, 2014f), 
Poroshenko repeats four times at the 2015 Munich Security Conference the need for 
Ukrainians to ‘defend’ their ‘land’ (2015c).  
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Analysis of references/citations 
Putin’s national-historical references are most often associated with Russia’s historic 
strength, demonstrated by repeated references to Russia’s defeat of Hitler (2014b, 2014e), 
Bandera (2014e), and the Nazis (2014d). Implying the need for a strong military, he makes 
an extended allusion to the symbol of the Russian bear, arguing that if the bear were to let 
down its guard, the ‘land will be taken over’ (2014a). Putin also makes a number of 
references to Ukraine and Russia’s national unity, repeatedly referring to ancient Rus, 
historically considered the source of both Ukraine and Russia, (2014e), and comparing the 
annexation of Crimea and Russia to the reunification of East and West Germany (2014e). 
Putin further reinforces this message with several religious references, citing the baptism of 
Grand Prince Vladimir in the ancient Crimean city of Korsun, which formally introduced 
Christianity to Rus, as evidence of Russia’s bond with Crimea (2014b, 2014e). Arguing that 
Christianity has been a ‘powerful, spiritual, unifying force’ (2014b) in uniting Ukrainians and 
Russians, he claims that Korsun to Russia is like Jerusalem to Islam and Judaism (2014b). 
 
Poroshenko’s national-historical references share with Putin’s an emphasis on Christianity. 
Poroshenko quotes twice from the Bible, as if competing with Putin for the religious high 
ground (2015b, 2014f). On the first occasion, he quotes the Gospel of Mark – ‘those who 
take the sword shall perish by the sword’ – advocating peace on the Ukrainian-Russian 
border (2014c). On the second occasion, he quotes from the Gospel of John – ‘in the 
beginning was the word’ – accusing Putin of hypocrisy and asking rhetorically ‘what kind of a 
gospel do you bring to the world if all your words are double-tongued?’ (2015b). While 
Putin’s historical references are designed to emphasise Russian strength, however, 
Poroshenko’s focus on Ukrainian victimisation. Thrice comparing Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea to the German-Austrian Anschluss (2016b, 2015a), Poroshenko likens the Russian 
army to the Nazis. He also implicitly compares Putin’s actions to those of the Soviet Union, 
citing historical ‘Russian aggression’ towards Finland, Lithuania, and Bulgaria, arguing that 
no such country would want to return to ‘Moscow’s orbit’ (2015c). Perhaps surprisingly, 
Poroshenko also makes references to Ukraine’s internal weakness, citing the disagreements 
between Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Mykhailo Hrushevsky as being to blame for the 
collapse of the Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1921 (2014c).  
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Analysis of argumentation 
Putin’s argumentation is rooted in his claim that, in annexing Crimea, Russia made a brave 
historical sacrifice to protect the ‘millions of Russian people’ on the peninsula (2015), with 
whom Russians share a similar ethnicity, language, culture, territory, economy, government, 
and religion (2014b). Putin reduces Khrushchev’s 1954 decision to transfer Crimea to the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to a ‘personal initiative’ on Khrushchev’s part (2014e), 
thereby stripping it of any legitimacy, national or international. Arguing that it left Russia 
‘plundered’ (2014e), he claims that Russia was forced to accept this ‘outrageous historical 
injustice’ only because it was incapable of taking action at the time (2014e). Casting Russia 
as the martyred hero, Putin argues that the economic sanctions on Russia since 2014 ‘is the 
price we have to pay to preserve ourselves as a nation’ (2014a). Presenting the sanctions as 
part of a broader ‘policy of containment,’ he argues that the West has ‘for decades, if not 
centuries’ directed its wrath at Russia (2014b). Putin reinforces his depiction of a heroic 
Russia by reminding the West of the debt it owes to the Russian nation. Comparing the 
West’s treatment of Russia to Hitler’s invasion, he notes that ‘everyone should remember 
how it ended’: with Russia ‘liberating’ Europe (20014b). Refusing to be cowed by the West’s 
aggression, Putin therefore claims that the annexation of Crimea, as an act of justice, was 
‘the embodiment of God on earth’ (2016). 
 
In contrast to Putin’s narrative of Russia as risen hero, Poroshenko’s national-historical 
arguments focus on Ukraine as the historical victim, casting Russia as the aggressor. 
Accusing Russia of stabbing Ukraine in the back, Poroshenko argues that ‘Russia has been 
preparing for the seizure of Crimea since 1991’ (2016b). He attacks Putin’s ‘rhetoric about 
brotherly peoples’, and accuses him of being motivated by a desire to return to ‘imperial 
times’ (2015b). Recognising Putin’s desire to ignite patriotism through the annexation, 
Poroshenko claims it was an act of Russian ‘self-affirmation’ (2014b). The most significant 
part of Poroshenko’s national-historical arguments, however, is his claim that Ukrainians 
have historically been part of Europe. Declaring in his inauguration speech his desire to 
return Ukraine to its ‘natural European state’, he claims that Ukraine has always been part 
of the ‘family of European nations’ (2014c). Being part of Europe, he says, is ‘at the heart of 
our national ideal’ and was ‘a choice made by our ancestors and prophets’ (2014c). He uses 
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such emotionally loaded phases as ‘European homeland’, and describes the Ukrainian 
people as ‘coming home’ (2014c). 
 
3.2: Normative Strategies 
 
Analysis of language 
Throughout Putin’s public statements, he uses normative language to delegitimise the 
claims made by Poroshenko. In employing the word ‘reunification’ to describe the 
annexation, Putin reminds his audience that Crimea used to be Russian (2016, 2015b, 
2014b, 2014d, 2014e), implicitly placing the burden of proof on Poroshenko to prove that 
Ukraine deserves Crimea more than Russia. He also repeatedly uses the word ‘legitimate’ to 
both undermine the Ukrainian government and justify Russian policy. He notes that the 
Crimean parliament was ‘a legitimate Parliament’ (2014b), that Yanukovych was ‘absolutely 
legitimate’ (2014b), that Russia had to protect its ‘legitimate interests’ (2014b), and that 
Crimea’s decision to join Russia ‘was legitimate’ (2014e), while there is ‘no legitimate 
authority in Ukraine’, and that some Ukrainian agencies are run by ‘imposters’ (2014e). He 
repeatedly calls the 2014 Ukrainian revolution a ‘coup’ (2016, 2014a, 2014b, 2014e), an 
‘armed coup’ (2014b) or a ‘coup by military means’ (2014a). He dismisses the Ukrainian 
protestors as an ‘army of militants’, ‘radicals’, ‘nationalists’, ‘neo-Nazis’, ‘Russophobes’, ‘and 
anti-Semites’ (2014e). Refusing to recognise their protests as calls for democracy, he 
condemns their actions as ‘terror, murder, and riots’ (2014e).  
 
Poroshenko uses similar linguistic tactics to those of Putin, condemning Russia for 
abandoning international norms and couching his condemnation in terms that de-legitimate 
Russia’s actions. He describes Russia’s ‘invasion’ (2015b) and ‘occupation’ of Crimea (2016b, 
2015a, 2015b, 2014a, 2014f) as ‘criminal’ (2014b, 2014f), implying that it is illegal under 
international law. He reinforces this message by accusing Russia of ‘terrorism’ (2015b) and 
of ‘flooding’ eastern Ukraine with ‘terrorists’ (2014a). He condemns Russia’s actions as 
‘unprovoked’, ‘blunt’, ‘brutal’, ‘shocking’, and as being a ‘violation’ of international law 
(2015b). Unequivocally placing the blame on Russia, he argues that the ‘aggressor should be 
punished’ (2015a), the ‘aggressor is Russia’ (2015b), and condemns ‘blatant Russian 
aggression’ (2014a). In contrast, he uses language to illustrate Ukraine’s adherence to 
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international norms. Claiming that ‘Ukraine is Europe’ (2016b), that it has made a ‘European 
choice’, and has a ‘European future’ (2014c), he aligns the country with the continent that 
dominates many of the world’s international institutions. He claims that Ukraine and the 
West ‘seek harmony’, ‘dream of a harmonious world’, and must choose between ‘harmony 
and zones of influence’ (2016a). Declaring ‘the world is with us’ (2015a) he portrays Ukraine 
as working alongside the international system. 
 
Analysis of references/citations 
Putin makes two key references to international norms and law. He refers in particular to 
the West’s hypocrisy towards the UN Charter, arguing that, under the Charter, ‘every nation 
has the right to self-determination’ (2016a). He points out that although Western states 
objected to the Crimean Parliament invoking the Charter when declaring allegiance to 
Russia, they made no objection when Ukraine referred to the Charter when declaring 
independence from the USSR (2014e). He also attacks the West’s claim that the Ukrainian 
authorities have to give permission for Crimea to join Russia, arguing that the West ‘agreed 
that the unilateral separation of Kosovo from Serbia was legitimate and did not require any 
permission from the country’s central authorities’ (2014e). He argues that Crimea’s 
declaration of independence was even more legitimate than Kosovo’s because it was based 
not merely on an act of Parliament but a referendum. Accusing the West of hypocrisy, he 
asks ‘if Kosovo has the right to self-determination, why don’t the Crimeans have the same 
right?’ (2016). 
 
Poroshenko’s normative references are more extensive than Putin’s. Noting that Ukraine 
was one of the founders of the UN Charter (2015b), he implicitly reminds his audience that 
Ukraine was abiding by international norms before they had even become norms. 
Contrasting this with Russia’s veto of the UNSC resolutions condemning the Crimean 
referendum and establishing an international tribunal to investigate the MH17 crash, he 
declares ominously that ‘everyone in this hall clearly understands the real motives of 
Russia’s veto’ (2015b). By reaffirming Ukraine’s commitment to the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples and criticising Russia’s treatment of Crimean Tatars (2015b), 
Poroshenko contrasts Ukraine’s and Russia’s attitude towards minority rights. He invokes 
Ukraine’s National Human Rights Strategy, portraying Ukraine as the very model of a norm-
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abiding state, arguing that Ukraine drew inspiration from the EU Strategic Framework for 
Human Rights and Democracy (2015b). Finally, Poroshenko makes reference three times to 
the Budapest Memorandum, whereby Russia agreed to security assurances for Ukraine. 
Condemning Russia’s actions as ‘a clear violation of the Memorandum’, Poroshenko claims 
that Putin’s actions have ‘undermined the value and credibility’ of such agreements (2015c).  
 
Analysis of argumentation 
Putin’s normative argumentation can be condensed down to the premise that Russia follows 
international norms, while Ukraine and the West do not. He denies allegations of invasion, 
declaring ‘we did not make war, nor did we occupy anyone’ (2016) and arguing that all he 
wants is ‘peace and harmony’ (2014e). Throughout his speeches, he repeatedly portrays 
Russia as being firmly on the side of international human rights and territorial norms. 
Pledging to ‘rehabilitate the Crimean Tatars and restore them in their rights’ (2014e), 
claiming to respect the ‘territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state’ (2014e), and arguing that 
Russia has supported Ukraine financially since its independence from the USSR (2014b), he 
argues that Russia acts fully in line with ‘the norms of international law’ (2014e). In contrast, 
he portrays the Ukrainian government and the West of abandoning such norms. Accusing 
the Ukrainian government of ‘subjecting Russian speakers in Ukraine to forced assimilation’ 
(2014e), and the West of using sanctions and the expansion of NATO to ‘suppress the 
growth of Russia’s capabilities’ (2016), he portrays Ukraine and the West’s actions as a 
deliberate plot to sideline Russia. He further accuses the West of purposefully excluding 
Russia from the negotiations on the Ukrainian Association Agreement, illustrating the 
West’s reluctance to engage in cooperation (2014b).  
 
Poroshenko uses similar tactics to Putin, arguing that Ukraine, unlike Russia, has followed 
international norms. He calls for ‘freedom, democracy, free speech, basic human rights’ for 
Ukraine (2016a), which it can only achieve through a ‘European choice’ (2016f). Its fight for 
Crimea, he argues, places it ‘at the forefront of the global fight for democracy’ (2014b). He 
argues that Ukraine wants to hold new elections in the Donbas under the observation of the 
OSCE and ODIHR (2015c), demonstrating his willingness to conform to international 
standards. He declares his preparedness to stand by the Minsk deal (2015b), and pushes for 
a new European Responsibility Charter (2015c). Arguing that Ukraine ‘plays by the rules’ 
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(2016a), he implies that Ukraine’s actions are firmly embedded in international norms. In 
contrast, Poroshenko accuses Russia of abandoning the norms of war, arguing that Putin is 
funding ‘terrorists’ in eastern Ukraine (2014c) and ordering its fighters to remove their 
insignias when fighting so they cannot be identified (2015b). He condemns Putin’s 
‘imperialist mindset’ (2015b), arguing that the ‘the world has been thrown back in time to 
the reality of zones of influence’ (2014b).  
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Section 4: Quantitative Data 
 
From the qualitative data, it might appear that Putin and Poroshenko spend equal amounts 
of time on national-historical as normative legitimation strategies, but this is not the case. 
Although qualitatively they use the same tactics, quantitatively it becomes clear that they 
use different emphasis. 
 
Table 2: Percentage of sentences each president uses that are part of each legitimacy strategy 
 National-historical Normative Neutral 
Putin 27% 63% 10% 
Poroshenko 13% 83% 4% 
 
As Table 2 demonstrates, while both presidents use normative arguments more than 
national-historical arguments, Putin puts the most emphasis on national-historical 
arguments while Poroshenko puts the most emphasis on normative arguments. In fact, 
Putin spends over double the time on national-historical arguments than Poroshenko, while 
the latter spends the vast majority of his efforts on a normative framing. The different 
emphasis the two presidents use also becomes clear when their most commonly used 
words are compared; Tables 3 and 4 illustrate each president’s 30 most commonly used 
words (excluding grammar words) compared to the other president’s, with their top 10 
words highlighted. 
 
Table 3: Putin’s 30 most commonly used words        Table 4: Poroshenko’s 30 most commonly used words 
 Putin Poroshenko   Poroshenko Putin 
People 84 45  Peace 47 5 
International 26 36  People 45 84 
Country 27 34  International 36 26 
Political 22 14  Country 34 27 
Sevastopol 22 4  European 33 6 
State 21 27  World 30 12 
Law 20 14  Security 30 5 
Support 19 12  State 27 21 
Nation 17 4  Rights 24 10 
Common 14 2  War 24 9 
Coup 12 0  Freedom 24 3  
Residents 12 5  Aggression 21 2 
United 12 9  Free 18 3 
World 12 30  Donbas 18 0 
Fact 12 7  Human 15 5 
Citizens 12 12  National 12 8 
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Me 12 6  Territorial 12 3 
Authorities 12 8  Democracy 11 3 
Forces 11 5  Choice 11 3 
Referendum 11 1  Occupied 11 0 
Dialogue 11 6  Charter 11 3 
Historical 10 2  Peaceful 10 3 
Rights 10 24  Nuclear 10 1 
War 9 24  Organisation 10 1 
Independence 9 14  Veto 10 0 
Years 9 10  History 9 8 
Relations 9 3  Win 9 1 
States 9 8  Democratic 9 4 
Partners 9 4  Annexation 9 0 
Colleagues 9 0  Global 9 1 
 
As Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate, Putin uses national-historical language more often than 
Poroshenko. He uses the word ‘nation’ 17 times to Poroshenko’s 4, ‘common’ (in the 
context of ‘common language’ or ‘common history’) 14 times to Poroshenko’s 2, ‘historical’ 
10 times to Poroshenko’s 2, and ‘people’ (in the context of ‘the Russian people’) 84 times to 
Poroshenko’s 45. Nevertheless, Poroshenko does frequently employ national-historical 
language, using the word ‘history’ 9 times to Putin’s 8, the word ‘national’ 12 times to 
Putin’s 8, and although he uses the word ‘people’ less frequently than Putin, it is still his 
second most commonly used word.  
 
The different emphasis on normative arguments is also laid bare by Tables 3 and 4, as 
Poroshenko uses the word ‘world’ 30 times to Putin’s 12, ‘peace’ 47 times to Putin’s 5, 
‘European’ 33 times to Putin’s 6, ‘freedom’ 24 times to Putin’s 3, ‘democracy’ 11 times to 
Putin’s 3, and ‘global’ 9 times to Putin’s 1. He also uses the word ‘Charter’ (in terms of the 
UN Charter) 11 times to Putin’s 3, and ‘organisation’ 10 times to Putin’s 1. This is not to say 
that Putin is entirely outdone, as ‘international’ remains his second most commonly used 
word, and he uses the word ‘law’ (as in ‘international law’) 20 times to Poroshenko’s 14, and 
‘dialogue’ 11 times to Poroshenko’s 6. Nevertheless, it is clear that Poroshenko’s argument 
rests to a much greater degree than Putin’s on a normative framing. 
 
  
S1773933 
Page 23 of 33 
 
Section 5: Hybridised Strategies 
 
The two presidents do not, however, merely employ national-historical and normative 
strategies as disparate strands, but weave them into hybridised narratives of valour and 
victimhood, each arguing the inversion of the other. Throughout his statements, Putin 
constructs the narrative that Russia has been historically victorious against forces intent on 
its destruction, first defeating the Nazis and now defending itself against the West. He 
claims that Russia is conducting this fight by valiantly and legitimately, in line with 
international norms, saving Crimean Russians from a Ukrainian coup, but that it is being 
victimised by a West that refuses to follow the norms that Russia adheres to. In his speech 
celebrating the first anniversary of the annexation (2015c), for example, he praises Russia’s 
‘heroic forebears’ for defending the nation, reassures his audience that Russia will do 
everything to ‘help Ukraine get through this difficult period in its development’, but that 
Russia is beset with ‘obstacles that others try to create for us from outside’. Similarly, in his 
address on the day of the Crimean annexation (2014e), he claims that Crimea symbolises 
‘Russian historic military glory and outstanding valour’, and that Russia respects the 
international norm of the ‘territorial integrity of Ukraine’, but that the West ‘prefers not to 
be guided by international law’. 
 
Poroshenko, meanwhile, argues the inversion of this, creating the narrative that, 
throughout history, Ukraine has been a victim of the Polish, Russian, and Soviet empires. He 
argues that, after centuries of weakness, Ukraine is finally demonstrating its valour by 
fighting for the international norms of democracy and freedom in the face of the ever-
predatory Russia. In a speech celebrating the second anniversary of the ‘anti-Russian 
resistance in Crimea’, for example, Poroshenko (2016b) makes an historical parallel between 
the annexation of Crimea and the Anschluss, arguing that ‘Russia has been preparing for the 
seizure of Crimea since 1991’, but that Ukraine, as a ‘European country’, will do everything it 
can to ‘defend the collective rights of communities’ in Crimea. Similarly, in his inauguration 
speech, Poroshenko (2014c) argues that Ukraine must learn the ‘harsh lessons’ that 
‘resulted in the loss of our independence’ throughout history, that Russia is nothing but a 
collection of ‘bandits’, and that Ukraine shall commit itself to ‘European democracy’. 
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Moreover, as well as weaving their strategies together, both presidents appear to have 
adapted their strategies depending on the audience they are addressing.  
 
Table 5: Percentage of sentences in each of Putin’s speeches that are part of each legitimation 
strategy 
 National-
historical 
Normative Neutral 
Interview to Bild 
newspaper  
(2016) 
11% 74% 15% 
Federal Assembly Address  
(2015a) 
100% 0% 0% 
UNGA speech 
(2015b) 
0% 100% 0% 
Anniversary concert  
(2015c) 
82% 18% 0% 
News conference  
(2014a) 
17% 67% 15% 
Federal Assembly address  
(2014b) 
28% 63% 17% 
Answer to a journalist’s 
question 2014  
(2014c) 
18% 73% 9% 
Gala concert  
(2014d) 
60% 10% 30% 
Crimea address  
(2014e) 
26% 70% 5% 
 
Table 5 suggests that Putin emphasises normative arguments when addressing an 
international audience, and national-historical arguments when addressing a domestic 
audience. When speaking to the German tabloid Bild, when addressing the UNGA, and when 
answering a question from an international journalist, Putin laid great emphasis on the 
international normative aspects of his argument, at 74%, 100%, and 73% respectively. In 
contrast, when addressing a Russian gala concert, when speaking at an anniversary 
celebration of Crimea’s annexation, and in his 2015 Federal Assembly address, he 
emphasised national-historical arguments, with normative arguments making up just 10%, 
18% and 0% respectively. There are nevertheless exceptions, as Putin emphasised 
normative arguments in a number of speeches ostensibly designed for a domestic audience: 
his annual news conference to the Russian nation in 2014 (with normative sentences making 
up 67% of the total), in his 2014 Federal Assembly address (63%), and in his landmark 
speech at the annexation of Crimea (70%). This could be explained, however, by the 
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likelihood that Putin anticipated that an international audience of journalists and political 
leaders would pay close attention to his statements, given that his Crimea address would set 
out his foreign policy towards the peninsula, that the 2014 Federal Assembly address would 
be his first since the annexation, and since his news conference was attended by 1259 
Russian and foreign journalists (Putin, 2014a). 
 
Table 6: Percentage of sentences in each of Poroshenko’s speeches that are part of each legitimation 
strategy 
 National-
historical 
Normative Neutral 
Statement at roundtable 
(2016a) 
0% 88% 11% 
2nd Anniversary of the 
‘anti-Russian resistance’ 
(2016b) 
44% 42% 14% 
Interview with DW 
(2015a) 
36% 63% 0% 
Speech at the UNGA 
(2015b) 
2% 94% 4% 
Speech at the Munich 
Security Conference 
(2015c) 
0% 95% 5% 
Speech at the Atlantic 
Council 
(2014a) 
16% 84% 0% 
Speech at US Congress 
(2014b) 
7% 93% 0% 
Inauguration speech 
(2014c) 
28% 71% 1% 
 
Poroshenko has also to some extent adapted his emphasis in the same way as Putin. To 
decidedly international audiences – a roundtable in Istanbul on ending conflicts, a speech at 
the UN General Assembly, and a speech at the 2015 Munich Security Conference – he 
focused almost entirely on normative arguments, at a rate of 88%, 94%, and 95% 
respectively. Conversely, although he puts less emphasis overall on national-historical 
arguments than Putin, he nonetheless enhances his emphasis when addressing a domestic 
audience in his inauguration speech and on the second anniversary of protests in Crimea to 
the Russian occupation, his emphasis on normative arguments being only 71% and 42% 
respectively.  
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Section 6: Broader Questions 
 
A key question to ask is why Putin uses the most national-historical arguments and why 
Poroshenko uses the most normative arguments. On the one hand, it might seem obvious 
that Putin would use more history than Poroshenko, given that Russia’s history has been 
characterised by more military victories and superpower status than Ukraine’s. Moreover, 
given that Russia has to find a way to accept its status as a ‘diminished Russia’ (Sakwa, 2008, 
p. 214), there is the need for Putin to reconcile the modern state with the Russian and 
Soviet empires. Nevertheless, it is not inevitable that Poroshenko should place little focus on 
national-historical arguments. Given that Ukraine’s population is so divided, he might have 
used his speeches as an opportunity to encourage national unity by more extensively linking 
Ukraine to its past. As Gwendolyn Sasse (2007, p. 66) argues, ‘discontinuity and a circuitous 
path to nation and statehood are the key themes in contemporary Ukrainian 
historiography’. With such a disjointed history, Poroshenko could portray Ukraine’s 
independence in 1991 as an historic struggle, and could, as Putin did with Russian history, 
invoke Ukraine’s struggle in World War Two, or resistance fighters against the Soviet Union 
to create an historical myth of Ukrainian strength. Poroshenko’s emphasis on normative 
arguments, however, can be credited to two elements. Firstly, as Sasse (2007, p. 80) points 
out, ‘the argument that Crimea was primordially Ukrainian requires implausible historical 
revisionism’. Since Ukraine only gained Crimea in 1954, it would be a stretch for Poroshenko 
to claim, even though he intermittently tries, that Crimea is historically Ukrainian. Secondly, 
Poroshenko’s need for international support likely trumps the need to rouse greater 
domestic unity. Putin, meanwhile, keen to dislodge the sanctions but aware of the 
impossibility of allying with the EU, UN, or NATO, and keen to portray Russia as an 
independent power, has less need than Poroshenko of invoking international norms. 
 
A second key issue is the question of why Putin emphasises Russia’s valour while 
Poroshenko emphasises Ukraine’s victimhood. The answer is not as simple as declaring that 
Russia has historically had military glory, while Ukraine has historically been a victim, 
because this is not necessarily the case. It is true that Russia played a significant part in the 
defeat of Napoleon and the Nazis, while Ukraine did not even exist until 1991, but both 
presidents could have manipulated history for their purposes. Putin could have emphasised 
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the historical suffering Napoleon, the Nazis, and Stalin inflicted on Russia, as well as the 
economic woes of the 1990s, arguing that Russia has always been the victim of history. 
Correspondingly, Poroshenko could have portrayed Ukrainian history as a teleological 
struggle for independence, which it valiantly won in 1991. Their decisions not to do this are, 
again, most likely due to what they want to gain from the international system. Poroshenko, 
as leader of a small state caught in the power games between Russia and NATO, most likely 
thinks he will gain more international support if he portrays Ukraine as vulnerable and in 
need of protection, while Putin, wanting to dissuade NATO expansion into its traditional 
sphere of influence, is naturally likely to portray Russia as an equal, or even greater, power 
than that of the West. 
 
The analysis of Putin’s rhetoric corroborates much of the existing literature. The findings 
revealed by the qualitative analysis in particular support Kalb’s (2015, p. 21) claim that Putin 
‘manipulated history’ and ‘set a nationalist tone’ in his March 2014 Crimea address. What is 
surprising, however, is that Kalb (2015, p. 24) mentions only in passing Putin’s use of 
normative language, claiming Putin ‘used the language of democracy to describe his brand 
of autocracy’, but not elaborating further. Given that Putin’s espousal of international 
norms comprised 70% of his speech (see Table 5), this is a significant omission. Putin’s 
normative rhetoric is discussed in more detail in Roy Allison’s (2009) analysis of Putin’s 
invasion of South Ossetia. Allison (2009, p. 175) argues that Putin ‘cloaked [the invasion] in a 
legal and normative discourse’, in the same way that Putin did with his invasion of Crimea. 
Just as Allison argues that Putin justified the 2008 invasion on the grounds that a Georgian 
attack on South Ossetia was an attack on Russia, Putin (2014b) argues that ‘Crimea is where 
our people live’ and that an attack on Russians in Crimea is an attack on the mainland.  
 
On the other hand, the findings illuminate the serious shortcomings of the typologies of 
legitimation strategies developed by Burghardt (1973), Pounds (1972), Hill (1945), and 
Strausz-Hupe and Possony (1954). Firstly, none of the typologies discusses how legitimation 
strategies might differ across different types of territorial dispute. None deals with the 
possibility that leaders might use different strategies to different audiences, nor the 
question of whether a leader might adapt their strategy over time. Neither do the authors 
discuss whether competing sides might use the same or different types of legitimation 
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strategies as each other, or why this might be so, and none discusses how a leader might 
hybridise their strategies, or which combinations might work in which context. Most 
fundamentally, none take into account the possibility that a leader might invoke 
international norms as a legitimation strategy. This is most likely due to the typologies being 
out of date, having been developed before the post-Cold-War ascendency of liberal norms 
such as the promotion of democracy and human rights. This suggests that there would be 
room for the development of new typologies and discussion of legitimation strategies in the 
literature on territorial conflict. 
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Conclusion 
 
Through qualitative and quantitative content analysis of Putin and Poroshenko’s public 
statements on Crimea, the two hypotheses are confirmed. First, both presidents employ 
normative arguments when addressing an international audience, both claiming to be 
promoting peace, democracy, and human rights as a means to legitimatise their territorial 
claims. Second, Putin, more than Poroshenko, employs national-historical strategies to a 
domestic audience, emphasising the historical links between Russia and Crimea, so as to 
reap domestic legitimacy for his claim. In addition to the hypotheses, however, a third key 
finding emerges. Although Poroshenko places significantly less emphasis on national-
historical arguments than Putin, he still employs national-historical arguments when 
addressing a domestic audience, but, unlike Putin, he lays emphasis on Ukraine’s weakness. 
This means that, when compared together, the two presidents use the same, but inverted, 
legitimation strategies as each other. Hybridising national-historical and normative 
legitimation strategies, Putin portrays Russia as an historically heroic nation fighting for 
international norms against a hypocritical West, while Poroshenko portrays Ukraine as an 
historically victimised nation, now at the forefront of the fight for international norms 
against a dangerous and imperialist Russia.  
 
A number of implications can be drawn from these findings. Firstly, that both sides use the 
same normative tools suggests that the international norms of democracy, human rights, 
peace, and freedom dominate the international system sufficiently for both sides to make 
recourse to such arguments in order to gain international acceptance. Secondly, the fact 
that both Putin and Poroshenko can interpret history to support their diametrically opposed 
claims to Crimea, and that Putin in particular can interpret his widely condemned actions as 
promoting international norms, demonstrates how easy it can be to justify a position in a 
conflict. Thirdly, the finding that the two presidents use the same types of strategies adds 
weight to the argument that the Crimea conflict is intractable. If one president were arguing 
they deserve Crimea to allow their economy to develop, and the other were arguing they 
deserve Crimea so their nation has access to historically significant landmarks, a 
compromise could be envisaged. The fact that they use inverted versions of the same 
hybridised strategies, however, both claiming they are achieving their historical entitlement 
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to Crimea by defending international norms, leaves little room for trade-off or compromise 
and suggests that reconciliation will be extremely difficult.  
 
As one case study in the wider phenomenon of territorial disputes, these findings on Crimea 
open two key avenues for further investigation. Within the case study, a logical extension of 
the above research would be to investigate, particularly through interviews or surveys, the 
extent to which the narratives expounded by Putin and Poroshenko are internalised by their 
respective populations. If Russians and Ukrainians do support their leader’s narratives, it 
would strengthen the leader’s position and, at the same time, make it more difficult for 
them to back down. If, on the other hand, there was a diverse range of narratives within the 
same population, it could be easier for the leader to compromise, but at the same time, 
could cause domestic discord. Down the second avenue, research could look at the extent 
to which national-historical and normative legitimation strategies are used in other 
territorial disputes, particularly where they might be least expected. The hypothesis could 
be developed, for example, that national-historical and normative arguments are less likely 
in territorial disputes over natural resources or maritime borders, where actors are not 
attempting to atone for historical suffering or gain a target population, but attain resources 
for future development. If, even in this situation, leaders use national-historical and 
normative legitimation strategies, it would suggest the two sets of arguments are the most 
pervasive justifications in territorial disputes. With this kind of further research, more 
knowledge can be gained on the subject of how political leaders justify their claims, and 
small steps can be made towards solving the jigsaw puzzle of the world’s states.  
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